Abstract: This paper explores a particularly simple model of choice under risk, based on geometric means and entropy. Despite its simplicity, it satisfies various prudence and risk aversion conditions, is consistent with the Allais paradox, and generates various insurance-related results. Within a portfolio framework with compounded reinvestments, our index fits the risks/rewards data from post-war US stock market returns and recent international markets, at least as well as does the standard deviation measures more typically used. It also generates returns that are consistent with the equity premium puzzle.
Introduction
When outcomes are uncertain, consumers need a way to place a relative value on alternatives whether those choices come from a set of lotteries or assembling a portfolio of assets with risky returns. Because of its mathematical elegance, the expected utility (EU) model is most often used to provide such evaluations (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) . The EU model (or at least one version of the EU model) dates back to at least 1738 (Bernoulli, translated into English, 1954) . Valuations with the EU model depend upon the type of utility function employed in the evaluation, making the EU model flexible, as well as mathematically tractable. But even with that flexibility, the EU model has been shown to be systematically inconsistent with some other commonly employed models of choice behavior and observed choices over risky outcomes.
For example in finance, modern portfolio theory usually begins by defining as the 'efficient' market opportunity set those asset allocations that avoid risk while yielding the highest expected returns (Elton and Gruber 1995, p. 70 , the efficient frontier). Portfolio risk is usually defined as the standard deviation (or variance) of the portfolio, after accounting for correlation among the assets. Expected returns are usually based on the arithmetic mean of the portfolio. More often than not, asset returns are hypothesized to be normally distributed.
The efficient frontier yields the greatest return for a given risk under these criteria, or equivalently, the lowest risk for a given level of return to the portfolio. The crucial question then becomes as to where to locate on the efficient frontier. In undergraduate textbooks, choice among risky possibilities are generally addressed by assuming that the consumer's preferences follow the EU characterization of choices. Borch (1969) had a fundamental argument against applying mean/variance efficient frontiers with expected utility choices. He pointed out that the efficient frontier characterization of choice was inconsistent with the expected utility model unless the returns were normally distributed and/or the utility function from which EU was constructed was quadratic (Johnstone and Lindley 2013) . Borch (1969) liked the elegance of the EU model and so tended to reject the efficient frontier model of consumer's portfolio possibilities. Others like the simplicity of the efficient frontier models, and so tend to limit the EU model as a basis for choice along the frontier.
Even setting aside these efficient frontier/EU model tensions, actual choices among assets (even without the portfolio-type analysis), are sometimes inconsistent with expected utility (EU). The EU model has to satisfy various prudence and risk aversion conditions to be consistent with actual choices. Even in its most general forms when all those other conditions hold, EU is still found to be inconsistent with some lottery choices (the Allais paradox, as just one example) and portfolio risk/returns (the equity premium puzzle).
Non-EU models vary greatly in their mathematical form and implications. 1 Like Bernoulli whose utility model was logarithmic in income and so his version of EU was fully explicit (that is, there was no general U(X) modeling where only some of the signs of the derivatives of U were restricted), we propose a non-EU model that is also fully explicit with one real parameter (or no parameters, if tradeoff parameter, lambda, is set equal to one). That is, like Bernoulli for EU theory, we suggest a fully explicit model as a starting point for non-EU model analysis. In this regard, we embrace Ockham's razor in seeking the simplest non-EU model which explains a lot of observed choice behavior under uncertainty. Our choice criteria differs from most of the non-EU literature, is simple, and applies equally to lotteries and portfolios of risky assets. We think this is important, as lotteries and portfolios are usually treated separately in the literature, and so subject to Borch-like concerns with aggregation from a model of choice among individual assets to a choice among portfolios.
In Section 2, we present the simplest non-EU model, which we call geomentropic preferences. But without an axiomatic foundation, nor a portfolio counterpart, our model of geomentropic preferences would be subject to Borchlike criticisms. In Section 3, we provide that axiomatic foundation and portfolio equivalence. Section 4 analyses the implication of our simplest model for commonly recognized results in the literature. Section 5 addresses financial market equilibrium. Section 6 uses the results in Section 5 to compare Asian economies' discounting of information uncertainty against other world economies (Table 1) . Section 6 also provides empirical comparisons of the use of entropy vs. standard deviations to explain US stock market returns since 1927 (Table 2) , and information discounting uncertainty over time and the implied relative risk aversion in US stock market data (equity premium puzzle, Table 3 ). Section 7 provides some concluding comments.
Geomentropic Preferences
"Geomentropic" is derived from geometric mean and entropy. Our simple non-EU choice model balances out geometric mean of returns against the entropy of returns (to measure uncertainty). The geometric mean of returns is arguably a better measure of reward than the arithmetic. Latané (1959) pointed out that for a stationary process where gains are reinvested proportionately, the portfolio with the greatest geometric mean results asymptotically in the highest terminal wealth. 2 Latané called this the maximum chance principle, and asserted that risking the same proportions on the same terms, even in a world experiencing some change, was at least as sensible as applying mean-variance analysis and expected utility theory. If agents implicitly adopt geometric mean strategies that have worked well in the past, there may be a tendency for geometric mean maximization to persist. (Samuelson 1971 (Samuelson , p. 2496 , by contrast, argued that even though maximizing the geometric mean leads to higher terminal wealth, it is still an inferior criterion: "These remarks critical of the criterion of maximum expected average compound growth do not deny that this criterion, arbitrary as it is, still avoids some of the even greater arbitrariness of conventional mean-variance Note: The intercept is restricted=0. The entropy and standard deviation (SD) were constructed using lags of the monthly values over the last year. Because only 12 observations were used to construct the entropy values, we report the results using a 4-support point probability distribution. Results using a 6-point support instead yeilded the same results except for Japan (whose entropy coefficient became negative). Correcting for first order autocorrelation yielded virtually the same estimates. Note: The intercept is restricted=0. The entropy and standard deviation (SD) were constructed using lags of the indicated market window length. Using a 2 week window also resulted in virtually the same pattern of results, as did constructing the entropy on 4-or 10-support point probability distributions instead of the 6-point support used here. Correcting for first order autocorrelation yielded virtually the same estimates. Using French, Fama/French factors.
analysis. Its essential defect is that it attempts to replace asymptotically sufficient parameters [E log(X), variance log(X)] by the first of these alone." 3 To include risk in models derived from expected utility, most researchers choose some function of the whole distribution of wealth (such as the lottery variance), or some function of the conditional distribution of wealth (such as value-atrisk measures, based on various quintiles of the distribution). Consistent with Latané's maximization approach, we develop a "maximum choice" model by generalizing his maximum chance principal. Specifically, we integrate uncertainty by considering optimal betting on wealth outcomes. We assume that the value of such bets is a power function of wealth in state i, w 1/+ i , where + is an unknown parametric constant, and that investors optimize the log of geometric mean value of those bets; such an approach yields a risk measure arising naturally from the Latané geometric mean reinvestment framework.
More specifically, suppose an investor chooses to invest, for each i, a share a i ≥ 0 of his or her wealth in an asset that pays w i if the state i is realized and nothing otherwise, with the objective to maximize
or, equivalently, the log of the geometric mean of their value of lottery bets,
subject to Ga i = 1. The a i only appear in the second term, and constrained optimization yields a i = p i for each i. Hence, lotteries are chosen on the basis of maximizing the following (choosing a convenient re-normalization):
The term (-i p i ln p i ) is the entropy discount for event uncertainty. 4 So unlike Latané, and consistent with Samuelson's critique, we do not make the geometric mean do all the work. We use the geometric mean of wealth to measure reward, but we subtract the log of the geometric mean of probabilities to measure risk, that is, we use entropy as our risk measure. Entropy has been useful in information theory (Shannon 1948) , inequality measures (Theil 1972) , and psychology (Norwich 1993) , but has yet to gain any traction-parallel with Latané's geometric mean criteria-in the economics of uncertainty and finance. 5 By trading off entropy against the log of the geometric mean, we develop a simple one-parameter index for lotteries. The entropy discount for a lottery's uncertainty,
4 Arrow 1971. 5 For one partial exception, see Yang and Qiu (2005) .
where + is a positive parameter, implies a probability-partitioning effect in lotteries. Indeed, we view the partition of the state space as a central feature of the consumer's perceptual apparatus regarding uncertain outcomes. A lottery initially presented to a consumer is perceived as different from that same initial lottery but where lottery branches have been perturbed with respect to probabilities: whether branches with the same outcome have been merged across probabilities, or whether new lottery branches are generated by dividing up a given probability for a given outcome into several new branches-such perturbations are new lotteries as far as the consumer is concerned. In particular, any division of p(3) into smaller probabilities with the same outcome (e.g.
) increases entropy and lowers the ranking of the lottery. Lotteries thus "simplified" or "expanded" across probabilities (for given outcomes) are different lotteries given consumers geomentropic tastes (and the partitioning effect due to entropy), and thus ranking formulas implicitly assuming such simplifications, such as the first order stochastic dominance criteria, will not provide a reliable guide to individuals' actual lottery rankings. In particular, a lottery with (wealth, probability) pair (w(3); p(3)) will be preferred to a lottery in which (w(3); p(3)) is replaced with a lottery containing the pair (w(3) + :; p(3)/2), (w(3) + :; p(3)/2) for some : > 0 even though such a choice violates first order stochastic dominance. 6 It follows that the independence axiom, which drives many of the results from expected utility theory, does not hold as it depends on the simplification property holding. In particular, merging lottery branches with the same outcome by adding their probabilities, or dividing an outcome into several new lottery branches by dividing up its probability, changes lottery ordering in our model but not in the expected utility model. So our model explicitly departs from the expected utility framework. 7 We show the index is empirically relevant in explaining real world lottery choices. We also extend the analysis to create an index for portfolios.
Section 2 formally introduces our index. It also extends the analysis to apply to endogenously constructed portfolios. In Section 3, we show that many of the desirable properties of a lottery index hold for our index, including some of the basic insurance results from expected utility theory. Market equilibrium 6 See Birnbaum (2005) for many examples of choices that violate the first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) criteria. We are grateful to Mark Machina for pointing this out to us. Note that the probability partitioning property of entropy implies that not only is FOSD an inappropriate metric for consumer's ranking of risky choices, but all moment indices of risk where probabilities might be so partitioned. 7 For prior departures see, for example, Machina (1989) , Starmer (2000) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) .
is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the estimation framework for the trade-off between geometric means and entropy. Section 6 concludes.

Geomentropic Preferences over Lotteries
A lottery is a list L = (S, S, p, w) where S is a finite state space, S is a partition of S, p : S → [0, 1] assigns probabilities to partition sets, and w : S → R ++ assigns payoffs to partition sets.
Let ⪰ be a preference ordering over lotteries. If for two lotteries L and
Our lottery index can be derived from preference axioms in straightforward fashion. The first two axioms, A1 and A2, are standard:
By a slight abuse of notation, let (S, S, 1, w) denote the the zero-entropy lottery that assigns w to every state. Specifically, S = S is meant to suggest that the partition contains only one set: the entire state space, S. This lottery is analogous to a risk-free lottery in the mean-variance framework.
A2. (Continuity) For any lottery L, the sets {(S, S, 1, w) ⪰ L} and {L ⪰ (S, S, 1, w)} are closed.
A consequence of A1 and A2 is the existence of a zero-entropy equivalent,
A3 makes explicit the trade-off between geometric mean and entropy.
A3(a). (Geometric Mean
Under A1-A3, lotteries can be ranked by their zero-entropy equivalents, as shown in the following proposition:
Proof. First suppose L ≻ L ′ . Let K and K ′ be the respective zero-entropy lotteries that are equally preferred to L and L ′ . (These exist by A2.) By A1,
and G * (L ′ ) are the geometric means of the risk-free lotteries K and K ′ that are equally preferred to L and L ′ , respectively. Since K and K ′ are risk-free, and
Although more flexibility is possible, a constant rate of substitution between risk and reward is a reasonable benchmark, and can be thought of as a first order approximation to actual preferences. It will also be seen to be general enough for many purposes.
A4. (Constant Marginal Rate of Substitution) There exists a constant
+ > 0 such that, for any two lotteries L and L ′ , if L ∼ L ′ then ln G(L)-ln G(L ′ ) = +[N(L)-N(L ′ )].
Proposition 2: If preferences satisfy A1-A4 then there exists
We will refer to the index constructed in Proposition 2 as the geomentropic index and the preferences described by A1-A4 as geomentropic preferences. In contrast to expected utility preferences, geomentropic preferences do not imply an index that is linear in the probabilities of the various outcomes. This linearity is a consequence of A2 along with Neumann's and Morgenstern's independence axiom:
The independence axiom has long had its critics, 9 and we do not impose it here.
Geomentropic Preferences over Compound Lotteries
, be a list of lotteries. The associated compound lottery with probability weights
where !p assigns ! k p(3) to all 3 ∈ S k and w assigns w k (3) to all 3 ∈ S k . This compound lottery can be interpreted as first randomly choosing a component lottery and then randomly generating the outcome of the chosen lottery. The geometric mean of the
Thus the geomentropic index distributes lottery weights. However, it does not merge branches with the same outcomes by adding probabilities, nor does it divide one branch outcome into two or more by dividing the probabilities. Because it does not exhibit scalability over outcomes, it does not satisfy the reduction of compound lottery assumption implicit in the independence axiom. For example, an expected utility maximizer is indifferent between the compounding of two identical lotteries with probability weights ! and (1 -!)) and the same lottery with certainty. By contrast, the geomentropic agent prefers the simple lottery (S, S, w, p) to the compounding of two identical simple lotteries due to the higher entropy of the compound lottery (the probability-partitioning effect). For the nonexpected utility maximizer, the two lotteries are not equivalent, a point made years ago by Mark Machina (1987) . Geomentropic preferences assume a trade-off between the log of the lottery's geometric mean and its entropy, instead of the reduction of compound lottery assumption inherent in the independence axiom of expected utility.
In summary, under geomentropic preferences, history matters in the sense that lottery presentation matters, with individuals perceiving subsequent algebraic manipulations involving outcomes as different lotteries. Scalability over outcomes implies non-unique geomentropic preferences. Harrison, MartinexCorrena, and Swarthout (2015) find that when choosing among many alternatives, the choices of experimental subjects do not support the reduction of compound lotteries assumption in his random lottery incentive mechanism. (See also Hillel (1973), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) , Miao and Zhong (2012) , Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, Placido (2015) ).
Geomentropic Preferences over Portfolios
A portfolio is a non-negative unit vector v = (v 1 , ..., v K ) where v k is interpreted as the fraction of the portfolio value W invested in the k th asset. The k th asset is a lottery (S k , S k , p k , w k ). Given 3 = (3 1 , ..., 3 K ), where 3 k ∈ S k for all k, let γ (3) be the joint probability that s k ∈ 3 k for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}. The geometric mean of the one-period payoff from a portfolio is
where W is the wealth invested and 0 k is the price of a unit of the k th asset. Portfolio risk is derived from the risks of the individual assets, as measured by the entropy of their marginal distributions, and their respective importance in the portfolio. Formally, define the marginal probabilities p k (3 k ) for the marginal distribution of asset k by
Define the entropy of the k th asset as
Then the entropy of the portfolio is defined as
Specifically, portfolio risk consists of the arithmetic average of individual asset uncertainty (N k ), weighted by their presence in the portfolio. Unlike the standard portfolio model based on mean-variance analysis, unsystematic risk does not go to zero as the number of assets increases. Rather, the portfolio risk converges to the mean asset risk. It is common in the finance literature to assume the existence of a risk-free asset. The geomentropic analog is an asset that exhibits only the trivial partition, that is, the partition S that contains only the entire space S. Such an asset has entropy of zero and exhibits one outcome in all states of the world. Denote the price of a unit of the risk-free asset (cash) as 0 C . It is straightforward to show that as the share of the riskless asset increases, holding the proportions of the other assets constant, portfolio entropy falls. If only the risk-free asset is held in the portfolio, then portfolio entropy is zero.
Dynamic Geomentropic Preferences
Suppose the investor behaves as if the stochastic process governing the states of the world is ergodic, that is, there exists γ :
and Lim t→∞ p t !3 = γ (3) for all ! and for all 3, where p t !3 are the transition probabilities from state ! to 3 after t periods. 10 We assume the dynamic geomentropic investor acts as if investing to maximize relative to this ergodic distribution, and thus write the investor's objective function as:
for the T-period horizon reinvestment problem when all available assets are risky. We assume that the appropriate entropy-metric for the portfolio, is the entropy of this ergodic distribution. Under these assumptions, dynamic geomentropic preferences when there is a risk-free asset (w C ) can be written as
A lottery is a portfolio with one risky asset.
Implications for Individual Behavior
Geomentropic Risk Aversion
An expected utility maximizing agent who strictly prefers to receive the expected value of a lottery rather than the lottery itself is said to be risk averse. Analogously, we will define geomentropic risk aversion as a strict preference for receiving the geometric mean of a lottery rather than receiving the lottery itself. Given A3b, geomentropic agents exhibit geomentropic risk aversion. This follows directly from the entropy associated with a non-degenerate lottery.
Geomentropic Complexity Aversion
We will say that an agent is complexity averse if L ′ ≻ L whenever w(3) = w ′ (3) for all 3 ∈ S and the partition S ′ is coarser than the partition S. Then the definitions immediately imply the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Geomentropic agents are complexity averse. Note, by contrast, that expected utility maximizers are not inclined to complexity aversion. This is because of the scalability properties of expected utility.
Thus compound lotteries are equally preferred to their expected utility equivalents, a property not shared by geomentropic preferences over lotteries.
Financially, investors with geomentropic preferences would rather hold a treasury bill than stock with an option that yields the same return.
Geomentropic Uncertainty Aversion
Geomentropic preferences exhibit a property that is analogous to the notion of uncertainty aversion introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . Given two equally preferred lotteries, geomentropic individuals prefer a convex combination of the two lotteries over the chance of getting either one. The result relies on the distinction between taking a convex combination in which the weighting variable, call it -, is a choice variable in the sense that its value is realized a priori and hence treated as non-random, and a true lottery in which one of the lotteries is received at random. In this latter case say the chance of getting the first lottery is γ , and as a random variable it induces some entropy. Uncertainty aversion means that any portfolio of the two lotteries, whatever the value of -, is preferred to a lottery with those two lotteries as prizes, whatever the value of γ .
Proposition 3: For all -∈ (0, 1), for all γ ∈ (0, 1), and for all pairs of lotteries satisfying (X; p) ∼ (Y; q), geomentropic preferences satisfy:
Proof. This is equivalent to -
Subtracting terms on the right hand side with similar terms on the left hand side, we can rewrite the last inequality as (
Since the two lotteries are equally preferred, the terms in the square brackets sum to zero, and the last inequality becomes 0 > +(γ ln γ + (1 -γ ) ln(1 -γ )), which is always true because γ is bounded between 0 and 1. QED (Gollier 2001, p. 236 ) defines prudence, a concept due to Kimball (1992) , by designating an agent as prudent if adding an uninsurable zero mean risk to his future wealth raises his optimal level of saving. In other words, an increase in risk for a given arithmetic mean causes the prudent agent to increase holdings of the riskless asset. The geomentropic analogue is for an increase in the entropy of the risky asset for a given geometric mean to cause an agent to increase holdings of the risk-free asset.
Geomentropic Prudence
Consider a two-asset world where asset 1 is a risky asset with price 0 1 and asset 2 is a riskless asset with price 0 C . The payoffs associated with the two assets are w 1 (3) and w C , respectively. The partition of the state space associated with the risk-free asset is the trivial partition containing only the state space and thus its entropy is N(L 2 ) = -ln(1) = 0. If v is the share of the risky asset in the portfolio then the geomentropic index of the portfolio (v, 1 -v 
For any horizon length, T, the geomentropic index is concave in v. If real asset prices are such that there is an interior solution-that is, if the optimal v is in the interior of (0, 1)-then the first order condition for the optimal choice of v is
Inspection of this first order condition for fixed asset prices and fixed distribution of returns reveals that a decrease in risk tolerance-that is, an increase in +-must imply a decrease in {v
w C } and (assuming the mean return of the risky asset exceeds that of the riskless asset) a decrease in v, the fraction of the portfolio invested in the risky asset, and thus an increase in risk-free investment.
Fanning and the Allais Paradox with Geomentropic Preferences
To explain some empirical anomalies (including the Allais Paradox) for the expected utility model, Machina (1992) employs a three outcome lottery model with p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) and corresponding fixed wealth outcomes w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ), where w 3 > w 2 > w 1 . In the probability triangle with p 3 on the vertical axis, and p 1 on the horizontal axis (with p 2 's value implicitly determined by the choice of the other two probabilities within the triangle), under expected utlity sets of indifferrent lotteries lie on parallel straight lines with slopes equal to Expected Utility indifference curves slope =
Given the linearity in probability assumptions under expected utility preferences (the result of the independence assumption in expected utility, see for example, (Gollier 2001 , Section 1.3)), lotteries lying further to the northwest receive higher probability weights on the better outcome (p 3 is larger and p 1 is smaller, holding p 2 constant), and hence, are preferred to all lotteries on indifference curves to the southeast. Geomentropic indifference curves exhibit more complex patterns within the Machina probability triangle than expected utlity. Geomentropic indifference curves additionally depend on the log-odds ratios as follows:
Geomentropic indifference curves tend to "fan out" (that is, their slopes increase as p 3 increases, holding p 2 constant) when lottery prizes are skewed to the right (that is, when (ln(w 3 ) -ln(w 2 ) > ln(w 2 ) -ln(w 1 )). Unlike the expected utility indifference curves, geomentropic indifference curves may be negative for low values of p 2 or high values of + as they "fan out."
In particular, this section shows that for values of + that are consistent with empirical observation (roughly 3 > + > .4), geomentropic preferences are consistent with Allais paradox choices. This is in contrast to expected utility theory, which is inconsistent with such choices, regardless of the form of the utility function.
The Allais paradox considers choices between two paired lotteries (Machina, 1989) , which can be appropriately regarded as choices between lotteries changing the wealth level of participant. (Recall that Latané's maximum chance principle is essentially a wealth investment principle.) Given initial wealth W > 0, consider four lotteries: 
Insurance Decisions with Geomentropic Preferences
The results regarding fair pricing and insurance demand from expected utility maximization also derive from geomentropic preferences. Specifically, let I * denote the amount of insurance an agent purchases at unit price s. The agent faces a loss of I with probability p; with probability (1 -p) there is no loss. The agent chooses I * to maximize
The first order condition is
With actuarially fair insurance, so s = p, the first order condition implies I * = I; thus the agent purchases full coverage. When s > p, so insurance prices are not actuarially fair, the left side of the first order condition above is less than one so the right side must be less than one at the optimum. Inspection reveals this to be true only if I * < I, so the agent purchases only partial insurance. This differs somewhat from standard expected utility, which can generate a demand for full insurance coverage, even with unfair prices, if the consumer is sufficiently risk adverse.
Dynamic Geomentropic Preferences and Asset Prices
Equilibrium and Re-Investment Certainty Equivalence
Assume that all investors have the same marginal rate of substitution, +. As explained in Section 2.4, and consistent with Latanés wealth reinvestment principle, we assume geomentropic investors behave as if maximizing over their time horizon, T, with respect to the ergodic distribution, γ . Investors' re-investment horizon has not been settled in the literature, though given Modigliani's (1966) life cycle saving/investing model, values for an individual's investment lifetime would plausibly be in the range of 20 to 40 years. The empirical sections below assume a 30-year horizon, but the linearity of key identifying restrictions implies that the estimates will be quite robust for the 20-40 year range. For long investment horizons, the value of a portfolio will grow close to its long-run geometric mean growth path with high probability. Hence, the compound growth of the risky portfolio over T periods less the +-weighted entropy of the risky portfolio should roughly equal the compound growth of the risk-free portfolio. In particular, the index of risky and risk-free rates will satisfy the following equality because of re-investment certainty equivalence:
where w C is the risk-free return. The empirical sections below report estimates of + using the certainty equivalencies of risky and risk-free portfolios. These estimates lie between 1 and 2, values that account for the equity premium puzzle.
Financial Market Equilibrium with Homogeneous Agents
A financial market is a triple, (x, W, 6), where x = (x 1 , ..., x K ) is the exogenous supply of each asset, W = (W 1 , ..., W I ) is the exogenous initial wealth of each investor, and 6(G, N) is the investors' geomentropic preference index. A financial equilibrium is a pair (0, v) such that v maximizes the geomentropic index and the market clearing conditions hold for each asset: v ∈ arg v max{6 (G p (v) , N p (v))},
for all risky assets k, and
for the risk-free asset. The first order conditions associated with the maximization of
set the partial derivatives of the objective function equal to zero: namely,
for all j ∈ {1, ..., K}. An aggregate first order condition can be derived by multiplying the j th first order condition by v j , summing over j, and canceling the common wealth terms:
For the portfolio as a whole, the net portfolio returns (given on the right side of the previous equation) are the average risky returns above the risk free return, normalized by the weighted returns of the whole portfolio. Investors set portfolio returns equal to + times portfolio entropy,
As shown in the appendix, geomentropic preferences are concave in shares (that is, concave in v). Substituting the market clearing conditions into the first order conditions, and simplifying, yields
(24) where W = I i=1 W i , the sum of wealth invested in the market by all the I investors.
The representative investor holds less of every risky asset in equilibrium given an exogenous increase in +-that is, the greater the investors' taste for certainty, the more risk-free asset they hold in their equilibrium portfolio (the lower the share of risky assets, k v k ). This is the content of the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The share of each risky asset is decreasing in +.
Proof. Substitute the market clearing condition into the first order conditions:
Designating the price of the risk-free asset as numeraire, as + increases on the right side, the price of the jth asset, 0 j , must fall to maintain equilibrium. From the market clearing condition for that asset,
, a decrease in the price of the risky asset must be accompanied by a proportional decrease in the share of the asset. QED ∎
For an individual investor, any portfolio satisfying the portfolio maximization condition
is equivalent, and different investors may choose different portfolios as long as the compounded, normalized excess returns to the risky assets in the portfolio equaled + times that portfolio's entropy. Portfolios with higher entropy must also have higher geometric returns.
To picture the equilibrium condition in eq. (26) geometrically, let the portfolio consist of three potential assets: a risk free asset, a riskier asset (with entropy N 1 ), and a less risky asset (with entropy N 2 ). The dotted simplex above the plane of shares of risky assets (v 1 , v 2 ) gives the portfolio entropy as a function of those asset shares, assuming that + = 1. (Different values of + merely rescales the slope of the plane, without changing the intuition.) The equilibrium condition in eq. (26) indicates that the asset prices (and, hence, returns) do not increase linearly as entropy increases (even if asset shares are held constant). The left-hand side of eq. (26) is not a linear function of those returns (prices) as shares are held constant. 
Estimating the Marginal Rate of Substitution
Recall the "first order" condition for the aggregate portfolio, with risky assets resulting in wealth levels w k (3) per share for the kth asset, when the 3 state of the world is realized, and wealth levels of w C per share for the risk-free asset in all states of the world:
This is the equation we estimate by regressing the normalized excess returns (essentially, k v k (E(r k ) -r C ), where E is the expectation operator), normalized by the average portfolio returns across all states of the world
, on portfolio entropy in order to estimate the + that optimally trades off asset uncertainty against asset returns.
In somewhat more standard, financial notation, w k (3) = 1+ r k (3), where r k (3) is the percent return per share in the specified time period. This more usual, financial market notation corresponds better to reported data, so that the aggregate first order condition can be written as:
Letting R * k be the relative returns to the kth risky asset net of the risk-free rate, the above first order equation for the kth asset can be written as
and for the portfolio, the first order condition can be written as:
To approximate this first order condition for empirical purposes, we make three assumptions. Like other researchers, we assume that the past matters in the sense of indicating what the future entropy and geometric mean returns are likely to be. Related to the first assumption, we also assume that average market returns of risky assets, less the risk free rate (suitably normalized), approximates the left side term above. Finally, we assume that the denominator in the left side sum, which is the average portfolio return, can be approximated by the average returns over the whole of the market period,
). This assumes that the error in measurement of the left side variable (so this is not a case of attenuation bias) can be treated as approximately zero:
With these simplifications, we regress the monthly average market returns less the risk free returns on the entropy of the market returns for international comparisons (Table 1) and US time trends (Table 2) , that is, we regress r mkt -r C , divided by the average portfolio returns over the respective period (and assuming v r = v C = 0.5), compounded for 30 years, upon the entropy for the market returns. (Tables using daily returns for the US yielded the same results, and are available from the authors upon request.)
The entropy coefficient estimates +, as indicated by the first order condition above. We calculate entropy from the history of average recent returns, using different window lengths, and then again, using different numbers of support points in the entropy distribution. None of those alternative specifications differed much from the results reported here. Correcting for first order autocorrelation also had virtually no effect on the estimates presented in Tables 1 through 3. Because we regress r mkt -r C divided by a constant (average portfolio returns over the whole period) on entropy, we can simulate market 'mean/variance' regressions by regressing the same dependent variable on estimated standard deviation from market returns (this is akin to fitting the efficient frontier relationship as specified say, in Elton and Gruber 1995, p. 88 , after suitable substitutions) for comparison. The coefficients on our normalized dependent variable may be different from a standard mean/variance model without the normalization, but the fit (regression F-statistics, probability significance for coefficients, and R-squares) statistics will be unaffected. This allows us to compare the explanatory power of entropy against the more traditional measure of uncertainty, standard deviation of portfolio returns. Again, because of the relatively high correlation between these uncertainty measures, it would not be surprising that they fit the data similarly in terms of regression R-square. This comparison we make for US data in Table 2 .
Table 1: International Estimates Using Monthly Returns Data
This data comes from Marmi (2013) , available for 16 developed economies. Again, the distinguishing feature of these data is that only monthly returns are available (where daily returns are available for US stock market data sets). As we have a relatively smaller time frame for the data in Table 1 , all the entropy and standard deviations here are constructed from the last twelve months of market returns using only the monthly return data. This means that there is likely more noise in our uncertainty measures in Table 1 than there is in Tables 2 and 3 . Nonetheless, the estimated +s are surprisingly similar to those estimated with the US data, available over a much longer time period. The starting time for each data set varies in Table 1 . The data for "developed" markets starts in 1988, and "emerging" markets (South Korea, India, Brazil, and China) have later starting dates (1992, 1993, 1995, and 1998, respectively) , as reflected in the sample sizes. Marmi (2013) used the 1000 largest companies in the market for at least some of the estimates. Excluding Japan (whose estimated + value is very imprecise, even among all the imprecision in Table 1 ), estimates for + range generally between 1.4 and 2.0, except for Australia, Germany, and South Korea, which were a little bit lower (and hence, seem to discount information uncertainty a little bit less than other countries in this period).
Larger estimated entropy coefficients indicate greater 'caution' against market uncertainty for the respective country. Note that the estimated Chinese + is virtually identical to that of the US (2.0345 vs. 2.0272) for this period, as are those + values for Brazil (2.1906), Canada (1.8846), and India (1.9976). The most conservative economies in this analysis are Hong Kong (3.4881), Singapore (2.4874), and Sweden (2.6209)-relatively older, established market for their respective geographical regions.
Tables 2 and 3
The data came from the Fama/French factors available from the Wharton Business School. Data used in the first two tables was for the January 1, 1927 to July 31, 2013. The results in Table 2 are divided into two 'columns'. The 'Entropy R 2 F-Stat' on the left hand side are the results for entropy estimates (regressing R * m on the market entropy, N m , of results, calculated returns in the indicated window), the results under the headings 'SD R 2 F-Stat' on the right hand side are for standard deviations (regressing R * p on the standard deviations calculated from the respective market window). The data represent the returns from the value-weighted returns of all CRSP firms (Center for Research in Security Prices data base) incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. It only reports information on ordinary common shares which either haven't been or don't need to be further defined (no firms incorporated outside the US, no trust components, no closed end funds).
The estimates in Table 2 and are OLS regressions without an intercept, as implied by the geomentropic model's first order condition for portfolios (given in Section 5). The estimated value of + using a 4-week market window (entropy and the standard deviation of market returns constructed from the last 20 days of trades) over the whole sample period from 1927 to 2013 is about 1.5, statistically significant at better than the one percent level (significance level is 0.0002). The overall fit using entropy as the dependent variable is not different statistically from the fit using the market standard deviation as the measure of risk/uncertainty: the R-square is the same on the left and right hand sides (0.0078 vs 0.0015), and the F-statistic for model fit are both close to significance (8.75 for the entropy model, and 1.56 for the standard deviation model).
Many things are apparent from the 4-week window models in the upper panel: very little of the variation in the normalized net returns is explained by either measure of uncertainty (one tenth of one percent at most), and entropy generally does as good a job at explaining the returns as does the standard deviation (SD). Indeed, in the post-war models (last three lines), the entropy R-square and F-statistics are much better than the standard deviations for the data based on monthly market returns.
In the estimates, we examine the overall period with and without information from World War II (WWII), and also examine just changes in the post war period to see whether risk tolerance has changed over time. The slight increase in + suggests less tolerance for risk after the war, but when placed in the context of a shift in a spline function, the upward shift in + towards less tolerance for uncertainty is statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level (it is significant at the 15 percent level). Perhaps the slight postwar increase in + is associated with lingering concerns resulting from the stock market crash of the 1930s.
Similarly, the division of the post war period into pre-and post-ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Act) periods was to test whether the expansion of stock market participation after the enactment of ERISA in 1974, significantly changed the observed +: either because of a change in perceived market transparency-which may cause + to fall, or a change in the marginal investor's tolerance for uncertainty-which may cause + to fall or rise. ERISA encouraged corporate pension fund investments in stocks by requiring that pensions be appropriately funded, and prohibited plans from holding more than 10 percent of the corporation's own stock. Institutional stock ownership also increased as individuals shifted from direct investment in equities to holding mutual fund shares and as public pension funds and nonprofit endowments abandoned their traditional policies against investments in equities. For example, public funds in California and 15 other states did not invest in any stocks until 1968. After ERISA, there was a dramatic increase in stock ownership by public entities (Bhide 1993) . Using either the 4-week window estimates in the upper panel (where + increases from about 1.52 to 1.61) or the 6-week estimates in the lower panel (where + increases from 1.61 to 1.64), the estimated + is relatively unchanged.
Results for the entropy coefficient indicate reasonable values for +, from about 1.5 to 1.8 when estimating first order conditions using daily returns. These results were virtually unchanged when the model was estimated by first order autocorrelation regressions. (The estimated value of + is obviously sensitive to our assumption that half the portfolio is in the risk-free asset: if the share of the risk-free asset fell to zero, the estimated value of + tends to one.)
Overall, the results suggest reasonable approximations for portfolio +s given the first order conditions derived from our theoretical model, and, entropy measures of uncertainty fit the data as well as variance (standard deviation) measures of uncertainty.
Table 3: "Certainty Equivalencies" Over A Lifespan
Data on the annualized risky rates, risk free rates, as well as real disposal gross domestic product per capita are available from 1929. We assume, following the literature, that the ex post trends in the last 30 years of returns approximate the ex ante returns, and use 30-year lags to calculate the geometric mean of risky returns, the probability distribution of risky returns (we use a 6-bucket decomposition in Table 3 ) and entropy. (As a practical matter, we also employ the (log of) geometric mean for the riskfree rates over the prior 30 years. The results using the arithematic mean instead over the period yielded virtually the same results.) The certainty equivalency of the risky, and risk-free, portfolios condition allows for a robustness check on the data, as it implies a particular value for + (here, p(3) are derived from the observed aggregate returns of risky assets):
Or,
For example, by 1959, the previous 30 years of data indicated that the annual log of the geometric mean of the risky asset was 0.06308, and the annual log of the geometric mean of the risk-free asset was 0.012533. Hence, the implied + consistent with the certainty equivalence condition is thirty times this difference (30(0.06308 -0.012533) divided by the entropy value for this period, 1.69337, which equals 0.89550, as indicated in the middle column of estimates.
The data for remaining years shows consistent values of + with the empirical findings in Tables 1 and 2 , which is also consistent with Allais preferences. Overall, + values are around 1.5, generally bounded between 1 and 2.
To compare our reconciliation of the risky and risk-free rates with the expected utility model, we also present implied relative risk aversion coefficients (RRA) using the same data (prior 30 years means for the risky and risk-free rates, whose differences represent the equity premium for risk) using the simple model of Gollier (2001, Section 5.2). The "equity premium" for 1959, the difference in risky and risk-free rates that compensates the investor for holding the risky assets, for example, is 0.109 -0.011 = 0.098. Employing Gollier's formula, we find the RRA factor is 100, an implausibly large value. Indeed for all years, these estimates of the RRA imply that an investor is so risk averse that she is willing to give up 29 percent of her wealth to avoid a gamble in which she receives a 30 percent wealth gain half the time, and a 30 percent wealth reduction half the time.
The four right hand columns suggest that as entropy rises, so does the equity premium. Indeed, a simple regression indicates as entropy goes up, so does the equity premium (a standard deviation increase in entropoy results in almost half a standard deviation increase in the equity premium), with an R-square of .18.
Concluding Remarks
Extending Latané's (1959) maximum chance, or wealth reinvestment principle, we examine a very simple one-parameter "maximum choice" model, which we call geomentropic preferences. This non-expected utility model trades off the log of the geometric mean of wealth against entropy, weighted by the parameter +. Geomentropic preferences explain many of the commonly observed characteristics of consumer behavior under uncertainty, including the Allais pardox.
When we extend this model to portfolio choice, and allow for reinvestment of the assets, we find geomentropic preferences fit the data as well as, and sometimes better than, standard mean-variance models. Robustness checks suggest that a geomentropoic characterization of the financial markets tracks aggregate growth as predicted by analyses using daily and monthly returns. Moreover, certainty equivalence under wealth reinvestment, given geomentropric preferences, explains the equity premium puzzle of the the expected utility model, which implies unfeasibly high relative risk aversion.
Our model explains lottery and portfolio choices likely to be observed in the market place. In future research, it would be useful to test our model relative to other explicit choice models both in lab experiments and in simulations of optimal portfolio holdings at the individual level given real market data. However, like other non-expected utility choice models, we do not expect geomentropic preferences to describe the behavior of non-market outcomes or unfeasible lotteries, say of the type embedded in perpetual-wealth enhancing lotteries (Machina 1989) .
Factoring out the common vW(1 + r(s))/0 + (1 -v)W(1 + r C ) terms and canceling them, and then factoring out and canceling the W terms, the expression for geomentropic prudence becomes
To take expectation of the left-hand term, we split up the symmetrically distributed, zero-mean : random variable into intervals:
Since : is symmetric (hence, 6(-:) = 6(:)), we can replace these integrals with
Combining these integrals, and letting D = [(v(1 + r(s) )/0 + (1 -v)(1 + r C ))], the defining geomentropic prudence equation becomes
By our requirement that : be small relative to the returns (so that there be no negative wealth values), the [: 2 ]/D 2 term on the far right hand side will be small relative to the other terms, so that our equality will only be satisfied if the positive term middle term, [(Bv) 2 (r(3)/0 -r C ) 2 ]/D 2 , is offset by the left hand term [2Bv( (1+ r(3) )/0 -(1 -r C ))]/D, which given that on average the risky returns will be greater than the returns to cash, will only be the case if Bv < 0, that is, if the share of the risky asset falls and the share of savings increases. QED From the form of the proof, it is obvious that it readily extends to several risky assets in our portfolio framework. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define temperance (we call this "arithmeticmean temperance") to be ((W -: 1 ), (W + : 2 ); 0.5, 0.5) ≻ ((W, W -: 1 + : 2 ); 0.5, 0.5).
A.2 "Weak" Temperance
They indicate that "...temperance shows a type of preference for disaggregation of two independent zero-mean random variables." Geomentropic preferences are consistent with arithematic-mean temperance, as we show below.
An analogous, alternative defintion for "geometric-mean temperance" would be ((W (1-: 1 ) , (W (1+: 2 ) ; 0.5, 0.5) ≻ ((W, W (1-: 1 +: 2 ) ; 0.5, 0.5). But this last preference ordering doesn't hold for equivalent geometric means, like it will for additive, zero-mean errors. Rather, in every case where the geometric means are the same, the geomentropic evaluation for the two alternative lotteries is equivalent as entropy for the comparison lotteries are also equal. Hence, ((W (1-: 1 ) , (W (1+: 2 ) ; 0.5, 0.5) ∼ ((W, W (1-: 1 +: 2 ) ; 0.5, 0.5), and there can be no geometric-mean temperance with geomentropic preferences.
"Arithematic-mean" temperance, on the other hand, leads people facing unavoidable risk to reduce exposure to another independent risk when preferences are geomentropic. We assume : 1 , : 2 are independent random, symmetric variates with zero mean. Entropy terms cancel, so that arithematic-mean temperance holds under our index 
A.3 Losses Hurt More than Equivalent Gains Help
To show the general nature of the result, we place the random shift in a portfolio context. Specifically, suppose that our portfolio has one risky asset (with share v and asset price 0) and one risk-free asset(with share 1 -v and nominal returns per share of 1 + r C ). Consider the change in geomentropic outcomes when the wealth levels achieved from the risky asset go from (vW)/0(1 + r(3)) if state s is realized to (vW)/0(1+ r(3) + :) if state 3 is realized, where : is a mean zero random variable (this could be the case for one or more states of the world). Then under geomentropic preferences, greater certainty in returns is preferred to uncertainty in returns for a portfolio (the results are obviously more general than this example of a 1 risky asset, 1 riskless asset portfolio), if That is, more randomness in the returns to the risky asset reduces its geometric mean (G r falls), lowering the geomentropic value of the portfolio.
A.4 Geomentropic Preferences are Concave in Shares
Proof of Concavity of Geomentropic Preferences
To show that geomentropic perferences are concave in the shares, rewrite ln G p (v) -+N p (v) as (A19) ln
w C = ( k , so that geomentropic preferences can be written as (A20) ln
Factor out 6 from both terms in the product, and take logarithms to get
where (
. This is concave in shares if for v k ≠ v ′ k , the following holds for all 0 < t < 1 (A22)
Canceling the common 6 and entropy terms from both sides of the inequality, the inequality is seen to hold if (A23)
Note that this inequality holds for any state of the world (that is, holding 3 fixed) as the arithmetic mean exceeds the geometric mean:
Since the inequality holds for each state of the world, it holds for all states of the world when summed over both sides of the inequality. (QED) 
